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This master’s report presents a conceptual framework that offers guidance to 
scholars as well as practitioners as they seek to investigate myriad questions related to, as 
well as to overcome numerous obstacles to, birthing institutionally disruptive products, 
companies, technologies, and business strategies into the world.  Questions of interest 
include: 
• Why do some institutionally disruptive companies successfully establish 
themselves while the rest experience bans or prohibitions that inhibit their 
economic success? 
• Why are some institutionally disruptive companies able to overcome bans or 
inimical regulations to establish themselves as leaders within the markets that 
they have disrupted?   
• What types of institutionally disruptive products, companies, and services are 
most likely to experience consumer support and social acceptance? 
• How have some seemingly less likely cases achieved success despite being what 
might have appeared to be underdogs at time 1?   
• Are there coördinated strategies that increase the likelihood of the above? 
• Why do some institutionally disruptive companies engage noncompliance in 
response to bans and prohibitions that target their services?  
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• What explains variation in the successful establishment of a class of similarly 
situated institutionally disruptive companies within diverse jurisdictions around 
the world?   
• How much of it is strategy versus structural factors?   
• What might the dynamics of institutional disruption illuminate about the future of 
work, human rights, and business strategy in the 21st century? 
• How might these insights inform public policy makers seeking to safeguard their 
citizens and maximize human development in an ever-evolving world?   
• What role does violence play in the interactions between institutionally disruptive 
companies and their established incumbent competitors?   
• Why is violence sometimes successful in repelling or expelling an institutionally 
disruptive company from a jurisdiction? 
• Why are some institutionally companies able to withstand violence?   
• Is it their true grit? 
• Who disrupts?   
• What are the inner psychological drives of institutionally disruptive leaders? 
• How can we identify them early?   
• Is institutional disruption ethical? 
• Is violence to counter acts of institutional disruption just?   
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• Alternatively, do institutionally disruptive persons add some value to society that 
merits embracing them?  
• Do the disruptive ethic and the spirit of innovation merit celebration? 
• Will the disruption ever end?  
• Should it?  
• Can we control it, channeling it into less destructive forms? 
 
Meanwhile, examples of institutionally disruptive products, strategies, companies, 
technologies, etc. that have been on my mind lately include: 
 
• Integrated multiperson networks through which persons communicate 
“telepathically” with the assistance of nanotech implants as they create 
works of art, literature, scholarship, music, and other works of passion. 
• An agency that designs, produces, and monitors love-cum-arranged 
marriages as well as other extraordinary relationships in which the above 
technology is provided. 
• An agency that monitors all living persons to identify people who would 
benefit from what I refer to as New Logotherapy, especially those who 
suffer from depression or other conditions that might result in them 
considering or experiencing suicidal thoughts; New Logotherapy involves 
injecting one’s world with new purpose—a seismic shock of the mind—
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while remaining hidden and unknown, operating through instrumental 
cyranoids, the fantastic environment of the patient, as well as, potentially, 
through their own thoughts.  Additionally, it will be economically feasible 
and sustainable through the inclusion of advertising content and 
integration with audiovisual entertainment, art, and other industries.   
 
My hope is that this report inspires others, sparking inspiration in the mind of 
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DISRUPTION, INSTITUTIONAL DISRUPTION 
 
My research examines the political and legal interactions of Institutionally 
Disruptive Companies as they enter markets or release products around the world.  An 
Institutionally Disruptive Company is a company that introduces a product, service, or 
provision method that presents a high level of legal and political uncertainty regarding the 
current and future legal status of the company or its new product offering; such uncertainty 
is most often due to technological change and novelty.  Thus, Institutionally Disruptive 
Companies are drivers of innovation as well as the upstream actors in the STEM field—
those that actually deploy technological developments within the market.  The institutional 
uncertainty at the time of their entry or launch is resolved through interaction with political 
and legal actors during disruptive bargaining interactions between competing companies, 
political and legal elites, as well as society more broadly.  Examining the entries or 
launches of these companies elucidates the role of law and politics in the integration or 
suppression of technological developments as well as within the novel deployment of 
extant technologies.   
Prime examples of recent Institutionally Disruptive Companies are Über as well as 
other app-based service networks; there are also numerous examples of established 
companies or professions releasing Institutionally Disruptive Products, such as mass-
market eyewear with surveillance capabilities or the use of psilocybin or other controlled 
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substances for therapeutic purposes.  These cases provide generalizable insights into the 
political, legal, and social dynamics of introducing new Institutionally Disruptive 
Technologies.  
SEEING LIKE AN INSTITUTIONALLY DISRUPTIVE COMPANY 
 
The politics of institutionally disruptive companies encompasses the market entry 
of novel Institutionally Disruptive Companies (IDCs) as well as the use of institutionally 
disruptive strategies by entrenched, incumbent companies to launch institutionally 
disruptive new products and services.   An IDC is a company that engages the strategy of 
institutional disruption, which involves the introduction of a product, service, or provision 
method that presents novel legal questions or political ambiguity regarding the legal status 
of the company or its new product offering.  This involves the disruption of formal rules 
or laws, but necessitates knowledge of their interdependence upon the informal, social, and 
cultural institutions that undergird the formal. 
An Institutionally Disruptive Company must engage in a multidimensional 
bargaining interaction to legalize its product, service, or provision method.  Thus, an IDC 
operates within and seeks to legalize the gray areas opened up by technology, often 
navigating institutional ambiguity as a competitive strategy to unseat incumbent 
companies. Rather than playing the extant game and fighting to replace the king on the hill 
through ordinary economic combat, they identify institutionally disruptive opportunities, 
often induced by technological change, and they seek to simultaneously shape the playing 
field within the political and legal arenas to entrench their strategic and competitive 
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advantages. That is, they seek to create favorable laws through strategic interaction with 
other economic, political, and legal actors.  Another recent example of a nascent IDC was 
an application that individuals could use to auction their public parking spots in San 
Francisco; some thought it a godsend while others thought it was a parasite as it reduced 
equitable access to public parking.  Meanwhile, recent examples of institutionally 
disruptive new products introduced or under development by incumbent companies include 
mass market eyewear with surveillance capabilities as well as mass market drone 
technology and self-driving cars.   
IDCs have launched products that have expanded the circle of winners within many 
industries, such as increases in access and affordability within the urban transport market 
in global cities. However, the strategy has also been employed by many companies that 
have inadvertently deepened inequality.  Additionally, the politics of institutional 
disruption also involves losers; as such, entrenched incumbents combat against the changes 
within the competitive playing field that the IDC seeks to enact in order to preserve their 
strategic advantage.  Proactive and responsive adaptation to technological developments is 
a key means through which to usurp the potential power of an insurgent IDC and preserve 
strategic advantage.  Strategic partnerships with IDCs are also an option; lawfare is another, 
either as a means to incentivize a merger or as a means to make a decisive strike against a 
New Market Entrant (NME.) 
Situating the concept within a broader framework of economic actors involved in 
the game of institutional disruption involves zooming in from the larger conceptual system 
of social organization to economic organization. One can then zoom in even closer to 
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examine the conceptual system that radiates from the concept of a company.  This is 
accomplished in the same manner as climbing the “ladder of abstraction” and developing 
a system of substantively relevant radial concepts (Sartori 1970; Collier and Mahon, 1993.) 
While the concept of social organization encompasses such disparate entities as secret 
societies, book clubs, political action committees, and the hall of fame of a particular drag 
Queen, the concept of an economic organization extends to a more restrained class of 
entities; this includes cartels, the  chamber of commerce, as well as OPEC.  The concept 
of a company is nested within this category of economic organizations; it includes both 
incumbents and new market entrants, such as established breweries or an IDC, respectively.  
The concept of an IDC is also related horizontally to the insurrectionary change agent 
described within the system developed by Thelen and Mahoney in their work on gradual 
and endogenous institutional change (Thelen and Mahoney, 2010.) However, the interests 
and identities of the actors within the game of institutional disruption are distinct and the 
strategies, while including those described by Thelen and Mahoney, aim for more 
immediate change and are often mixed and multidimensional, though an IDC may be 
prepared for the trenches. 
The classification of a company is first determined according to incumbency and 
then according to whether it or a specific product it offers operates within the shadows, the 
disruptive opportunity space, or the light of the law.  Thus, there are six different types of 
companies operating within the system—Legal Incumbents, Institutionally Disruptive 
Incumbent Companies, Illegal Incumbents, Legal New Market Entrants, Institutionally 
Disruptive NME Companies, and Illegal NMEs.  The illegal types may enter as unlawful 
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Visual 1: A Conceptual System: A Typology of Companies with regard to disruptive status, legality, and incumbency  
*The Core Concept of the Company is first classified according to incumbency and then according to whether it 
operates within the shadows, the DOS, or the light. 
 
NMEs or as institutionally disruptive NME companies or they may currently operate as 
entrenched incumbents within the black market. NMEs seek to become incumbents and 
most often do so though entering with a product or service that is unambiguously legal 
within the jurisdiction(s) they seek to operate within; alternatively, they may successfully 
A CONCEPTUAL SYSTEM 
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engage a strategy of institutional disruption and achieve a legal right to provide their good 
or service.  An NME may have established operations within one or more other 
jurisdictions, or it may be nascent, seeking to establish itself for the first time within any 
given jurisdiction j.  Therefore, institutionally disruptive companies, regardless of their 
incumbent or nascent status, are a transitory category as they are sorted into a legal or 
illegal classification through the process of strategic interaction with social, political, legal, 
and economic actors.   
All institutionally disruptive companies operate within what I refer to as the 
Disruptive Opportunity Space (DOS.)  The disruptive opportunity space is defined as a 
space existing at time t within which the probability of a product or service, pdt*, being 
legalized at time t+1 is within the interval , where  indicates a value of r that is between 
.1 and .9.  As such, it is a hazy concept, the contours of which are defined according to a 
fluctuating subjective probability estimate.  Thus, the DOS exists between the shadows of 
illegality and the light of the law; within Visuals 2, 3, and 4, the DOS is represented as the 
light gray area. The disruptive opportunity space may expand, or it may contract, as legal 
uncertainty is resolved, and/or political positions become more clearly established.   An 
opportunity may exist at time t-1 only for the disruptive opportunity space to contract due 
to a set of legal decisions or political pronouncements prior to time t+1 (See Visual 5.)  
Alternatively, a company may launch a product or enter within a disruptive opportunity 
space at time t-1 and successfully enter the market, thereby achieving legalization so that 
its offering is unambiguously legal at time t+1 (See Visual 3.)  The disruptive opportunity 
space is composed of a narrow space of legal uncertainty as well as a broader area of 
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political possibility.  The spaces emerge as a result of fluctuations in political and legal 
systems and the interaction of these systems with economic and technological evolution. 
Transportation Network Companies (TNCs) 
represent a class of institutionally disruptive companies 
that entered directly through the DOS upon perceiving 
an opportunity that emerged due to technological 
change.  However, there are also companies or other 
economic interest groups that seek to gradually emerge 
from the shadows to legalize what is unambiguously 
illegal at any given moment, some of which have 
succeeded in creating opportunities for rapid and 
disruptive institutional change; an example of this latter dynamic would be the movement 
to legalize marijuana and THC for recreational purposes, which has successfully achieved 
legalization and created market opportunities for a number of institutionally disruptive 
companies in the immediate wake of legalization. The new 
regulatory framework that would govern businesses seeking 
to provide legal THC was uncertain during the initial period 
following its legalization for recreational purposes.  A 
disruptive opportunity space existed, and the eventual 
contours of the market governance institutions were 
contingent upon a set of intertwined bargaining interactions.   
Visual 3: Operations Within the Disruptive 
Opportunity Space 
Visual 2: Successful Institutional 
Disruption 
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An example of an entrenched incumbent company that engaged in this game of 
institutional disruption while THC was being legalized in Washington is Cupcake Royale, 
a gourmet cupcake chain that is well known in the Seattle area and had been featured on 
cable television baking competitions.  Whereas newly licensed dispensaries were granted 
a right to provide THC products through a lottery, Cupcake Royale sought to leverage its 
reputation as the premier cupcake store in the region in order to open a chain of special 
cupcake stores with gourmet baked goods infused with THC. As such, the company first 
attempted to achieve a legal right to produce and sell THC infused products through 
negotiating with city and state regulators and politicians.  Whereas a movement legalized 
what was previously a creature of the black market, the success of the movement created a 
window of opportunity, a disruptive opportunity space, for companies similar to Cupcake 
Royale to attempt to shape the market governance institutions to enable and privilege their 
operations.  As such, one cannot reefer to drug dealers as institutionally disruptive in states 
or countries where THC is legally prohibited; they clearly operate within the shadows 
beyond the interval .  Yet, where THC has been legalized, opportunities have emerged in 
the wake of legalization for institutionally disruptive companies, whether as NMEs or 
incumbents, to attempt to achieve a legal right to provide creative new products and/or 
services involving THC, such as delivery services, public accommodations for THC 
consumption, or classes and materials for home cultivators.  
Some of these creative new services that perceived and entered within the 
disruptive opportunity space have succeeded, such as Cupcake Royale, which now also 
operates The Goodship Company. The slope defining uncertainty about the legality of THC 
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provision, who could and could not provide it as well as the means through which one 
could gain a right to do so, within jurisdictions that legalized marijuana became clearly 
defined; as such, companies transitioned back into the normal game of market governance.  
A similar process was observed with regard to filesharing websites.   
Napster, which was first released in 1999, provided a peer to peer network for 
individuals to share files, especially music and video content, via the internet.  The problem 
was that this website allowed individuals to do so for free and without providing 
compensation to the owners of copyrights for the material being shared, which threatened 
the dominant models of music and video provision at the 
time.  Most notably, members of the recording industry 
joined together and responded heavy-handedly by suing 
the company for copyright infringement.  In a 2001 case, 
A&M Record Inc. v. Napster Inc., the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California both 
held that the company was vicariously infringing on the 
companies’ intellectual property rights.  It was slapped with an injunction and has never 
returned to the prominence it once held; within Visual 4 this company is represented as 
pdt’ or the triangle.  
Visual 4: Competing IDCs within the DOS 
at time t-1 
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However, both prior to and in the wake of the 
decision, some companies developed similar, yet more 
palatable, institutionally disruptive models of music and 
video sharing that were subsequently legalized, such as 
Apple iTunes.  Entrenched incumbent companies as well 
as new market entrants perceived an opportunity to 
navigate the gray area between the illegality of copyright 
infringement and the extant legal models of the time.  These companies successfully 
negotiated with diverse industry stakeholders as well as political and legal actors while 
keeping the demands of consumers in mind, thereby transforming numerous industries and 
expanding access to media around the world.  Within Visuals 4 and 5, these companies 
represent pdt* and the circle.   
This comparison of THC, filesharing, and TNCs illuminates the interaction 
between the shadows, the disruptive opportunity space, and the light of the law as legal and 
political change, economic and technological change, or both simultaneously curtail or 
create opportunities for institutionally disruptive companies.  Additionally, these 
comparisons demonstrate that institutionally disruptive and more gradual strategies of 
enacting institutional change often productively comingle, such as in the case of THC 
legalization where a prolonged movement created opportunities for IDCs to emerge.  This 
chapter on Designing Institutional Disruption explicates what the narrow space of legal 
uncertainty within the DOS is, its relationship to the wider space of political possibility, as 
well as how to navigate within it.  Designing institutional disruption with foresight may 
Visual 5: A Spatial Comparison of 
Competing IDCs at Time t+1 
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allow an IDC to ensure that the law does not block the path to successful institutional 
disruption while also securing the support of the law to overcome political opposition. 
WHY INSTITUTIONAL DISRUPTION? 
 
The conceptual framework takes an illusion of a static world as its premise, yet this 
false illusion is precisely the image that most individuals have of the law, or at least it is a 
stronger approximation of their concept of the nature of law given their experience as a 
human having existed within an infinitesimally small slice of the larger period of legal 
development.  Conceptualization is prior to theoretical development and empirical testing; 
as such, I have sought to explicitly define the conceptual environment of the project.  
Together, the concepts presented within the paper bound what might otherwise appear to 
be chaos.   
Some might question why the concept of institutional disruption appears to equate 
three seemingly distinct phenomena.  Those empirical objects within the upper bound as r 
approximates 1 might seem to fit within an alternative conceptual frame.  Indeed, they do 
fit within many alternative conceptual frames, yet I include them because they indicate the 
outer bounds of the Disruptive Opportunity Space and doing so allows one to better 
understand how something that is almost certainly of the light may enter into this hazy 
space.  The nature of the DOS is dynamic, it expands, it shifts, it transforms along with the 
development of the social-legal-political-economic system; accounting for the outer 
bounds of the space allows for a clear understanding of institutional disruption as a 
dynamic process.   
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AN ABNORMAL DISTRIBUTION 
 
The upper bound is especially important to consider because a company might be 
completely legal, yet encounter intense opposition upon its launch such that it is “sorted” 
into the haze or the shadows, areas from which is can be difficult to slither into the light.  
Meanwhile, those objects within the lower bound similarly might seem to fit better with 
the concept of pure disruption, the attempt to rapidly and significantly enact a punctuated 
equilibrium in the law as well as within society more generally.  Indeed, they often do, yet 
they complement this framework of institutional disruption as the more extreme examples 
of this area of political-legal-technological interaction; they constitute the dark side of the 
outer bounds of the DOS.  Additionally, there are cases of Hail Marys within the lower 
bound that have successfully achieved legalization through masterful and rapid strategy 
despite a lower r value at time t-1. An example is Playboy as well as other pornographic 
magazines, which packaged something of the black market in such a way as to successfully 
Visual 6: The Abnormal Distribution 
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legalize it; cultural work was also necessary, and the companies were interdependent on 
broader movements.  Yet Hefner and others projected an ethos, tip toed a fine line, and 
successfully seized an institutionally disruptive opportunity.  In conjunction with broader 
movements, he and other moguls of the porn industry succeeded in turning something 
enigmatic and taboo into something we now see as a legal norm within our society.  
Meanwhile, the case of marijuana legalization (above) represents another example of a case 
where a broader movement and IDCs were interdependent; IDCs may have participated in 
these movements or merely perceived and seized opportunities created by them.    
The middling cases, then, might be argued to be better characterized as cases of 
novelty.  Indeed, they often are, yet novelty itself is disruptive.  So many choices are preset 
for us, so much of our thought, our reaction, our experience is automated, conditioned, a 
matter of precedent.  Yet novelty induces possibility, it induces uncertainty, it induces 
anxiety, and, most of all, it introduces choice.  We must decide; we must resolve 
uncertainty.  Such cases are more likely to emerge from processes of technological change.   
 
One can therefore see that, in the abnormal distribution above, peak institutionally 
disruptive status is achieved where r = .5; what would otherwise be a coin toss becomes a 
game of skill.  Execution is paramount.  To say that this is a game of pure skill would be 
laughable; yet to say that it is a game of pure luck would be equally so.  With the normality 
of clear legality or blatant illegality at the margins, the abnormal distribution indicates that 
the necessary levels of skill and luck required to achieve legalization are inversely related 
to r. 
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Some might also question whether an alternative conceptual approach would be 
more appropriate; some might prefer to think in terms of preexisting frameworks.  We 
could just call them innovative, but there are lots of innovations that are not institutionally 
disruptive.  Similarly, we could just call them disruptive, but that does not quite get at the 
crux of what I examine—the disruption of rules, specifically in ways that are not clearly 
illegal or legal, at least at time 1.  I contend that the presentation of the various concepts 
deployed in this paper, together as a unified whole, are superior to alternative approaches 
to bounding these concepts. A lexical approach has inspired the systematic, concise, and 
consolidated presentation of this complex concept (see Skaaning, Gerring, and 
Bartusevicius 2015.) Additionally, an appreciation of the importance of gradations in our 
approach to conceptualization has also informed the consideration of the precise borders 
of the concept (see Elkins, 2000;) this allows for a consideration of the IDC as having an 
evolutionary relation to the shadows, light, and the other dynamic variables operating 
within them. As such, the concept is somewhere between these two extremes of conceptual 
precision and fluidity.   
The concept is also clearly situated and differentiated vis-à-vis other social science 
concepts, such as the insurrectionary change agent of Thelen and Mahoney (2010) as well 
as the concept of a disruptive innovation, which is bounded to consider the effect of the 
object within the market (Christensen et al 2015; Bower and Christensen 1995.) 
Additionally, the concept is related to, yet differentiated from, its use in social movement 
theories, such as Tarrow (1994.) Not all concepts are amenable to extreme parsimony; 
legitimacy, for example, is such a complex concept. Yet, in Economy & Society Max Weber 
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(1921) eloquently provided a clear conceptualization of legitimacy in general and in its 
ideal typical forms.  In this project, I have balanced parsimony, complexity, as well as the 
necessary situation of the concept in relation to contemporary ordinary language uses as 
well as in relation to other uses of the concepts within various social scientific disciplines 
in an enduring fashion.  Referring to them as NMEs in some cases, read: enemies, is also 
meant to make it fun.  To sum up the concept, I present to you a conceptual poem, an absurd 
poem, a circle. 
CONCEPTUALIZATION AS POETRY 
THE INSTITUTIONALLY DISRUPTIVE C:  
A company, 
A company that deploys the Strategy of Institutional Disruption. 
The Strategy of Institutional Disruption involves introducing a company or product within 
the Disruptive Opportunity Space. 
The Disruptive Opportunity Space is bounded within the interval ,  
which indicates a probability of legalization, represented as r,  
between .1 and .9 at or before the conclusion of period t. 
A period of t, for analytical purposes, is a year or less to legalize a company...  
 
 
The time component, the permissible duration of period t, necessitates clear 
specification, otherwise almost anything could be within the interval; thus, the maximum 
time considered between time t-1 and time t+1 is a year in order to distinguish between 
companies that are clearly within the shadows or the light as well as those that we ought to 
genuinely consider to be operating within the DOS; in other words, the inclusion of a 
temporal element in the classification allows the analyst to distinguish between companies 
that would need to engage a more gradual strategy and those who might be able to sprint.  
Visual 7: Conceptualization as Poetry 
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A company may engage in processes of institutional disruption for longer than that period, 
yet its classification by the analyst is determined with the probability of r approximating 
one within a year.  A hazy concept is, essentially, bounded chaos. Attempting to bound 
chaos requires an extraordinary approach to conceptualization; it is simultaneously the 
process of capturing and creating meaning.   
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THEORIES OF INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS  
  
The literature on institutional dynamics provides alternative perspectives on the 
nature of institutions as well as the processes through which they reproduce themselves 
and evolve.  Additionally, these theories account for interactions between law and politics 
in ways that illuminate the dynamic interactions of IDCs within political, legal, economic, 
social, and cultural context. Knight (1995) identifies three different types of institutional 
theory: convention-based, contracting-based, and the bargaining approach.  Each is also 
reflected in the forms discussed by Hall and Taylor (1996)—sociological, rational choice, 
and historical institutionalism.  Knight notes that the first two appear to operate best within 
worlds of pure cooperation or pure competition, respectively; however, he notes that 
bargaining is the most realistic depiction of a world that is neither fully cooperative nor 
fully competitive.  A bargaining approach emphasizes distributional consequences as well 
as the struggle for and primacy of strategic advantage; it is also especially applicable to 
interactions between actors with diverse interests, including market actors and the State. 
 Meanwhile, within the literature on institutional strength, the perspective of the 
State as regulator, those responsible for institutional design and management, takes center 
stage; theories of institutional strength emphasize the stability, significance, and 
compliance inducing properties of institutions (Levitsky and Murillo, 2009; Brinks, 
Levitsky, and Murillo 2019.) This literature presents key considerations for market actors 
seeking to impact a stable institutional order to have in mind, especially where one might 
expect opposition from those who benefit from current institutional orders.  Meanwhile, 
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beyond merely considering the different interests involved, other scholars have also 
provided integrated approaches to the study of diverse institutions that consider mixes of 
sociological, historical as well as rational considerations; alternative perspectives on how 
institutions operate and evolve. These include North (1990), Hunter (2007), Greif and 
Laitin (2004), as well as Morrow (2014), among others.  I similarly blend these different 
styles of analysis while drawing on the insights of these and other scholars to illuminate 
the models that I develop with diverse perspectives in mind.   
Recent episodes of institutional disruption, even within many developed countries, 
make clear that bargaining in the form of political and legal strategy within cultural and 
institutional constraints are still vital elements of economic competition within diverse 
polities at all levels of development. As Thelen identifies in an early study of an emblematic 
institutionally disruptive company, these interactions present unique strategic opportunities 
and challenges within different national contexts (Thelen, 2018.)  Thus, entering a market 
as a disruptive new market entrant or launching a disruptive product as an entrenched 
incumbent involves a dynamic, multidimensional, and volatile interaction between the 
institutionally disruptive company and a set of economic, social, legal, and political actors.  
Thus, the entry or launch of an institutionally disruptive company is a critical juncture 
during which a company must navigate contingent and high-risk strategic interactions, the 
consequences of which reverberate within other dimensions of the game.  Capoccia and 
Kelemen (2007) define critical junctures as “relatively short periods of time during which 
there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome 
of interest.” Scholars tend to look towards these critical junctures as periods or flashpoints 
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where paths diverge from their previously stable course and exhibit punctuated 
changes.  While others have employed the concept to study regime transitions or other 
macrolevel outcomes, such as Collier and Collier (1991), the emphasis on a period of 
enhanced agency and contingency accurately describes the interactions I analyze as well.   
Accounting for process and sequence also has a long tradition in Social 
Science.  Historical institutionalists, scholars of political development, and many strategic 
choice analysts within the various subfields of the discipline have long argued for the 
importance of accounting for sequence, complexity, and contingency, including O’Donnell 
and Schmitter (1986) and Huntington (1968.) Additionally, in his study of US Supreme 
Court certiorari decisions, HW Perry (1991) argues for the importance of a process-based 
understanding of judicial decision making. Process, sequence, and a little bit of chance all 
matter.  Thus, institutional disruption is accepted as a nonlinear process; it is one for which 
a company may plan, but it is also one that a company must navigate responsively as one 
traverses stormy waters.   
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THE THEATER OF INSTITUTIONAL DISRUPTION 
 
While looking down from above, the actors are the economic, political, and legal 
elites as well as the people.  The incomplete star in Visual 6 depicts their traditional 
linkages.  The elite political actors include the legislative and executive actors responsible 
for creating and enforcing the market governance institutions within the jurisdiction; this 
may also include superordinate authorities, such as national level politicians who may have 
an impact on subnational market governance institutions.  The courts, at the subnational 
and superordinate levels are the primary legal actors.   The people, as consumers or 
producers within the market as well as through their role as citizens, constitute another set 
of primary actors within the game and impact the behavior of the elite actors. Thus, the 
Institutionally Disruptive Company must simultaneously manage its political relations, its 
internal operations, and the consumer base.   
Visual 8: The Actors Within the Theater 
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The game of institutional disruption unfolds within this theater through a multistage 
process that is composed of (1) the initial entry or launch, (2) the legal establishment, and, 
in the case of successful disruption, (3) the initial legal operations stages, as well as (4) a 
return to business as usual.  The legal operations stage marks the tail end of the period of 
disruption during which the institutionally disruptive company must endure remaining 
conflicts, defend its right to operate, and restore balance while seeking to entrench its 
strategic advantage within the political, legal, and economic arenas of the theater. A 
strategic response to litigation is often an integral aspect of forging the path of successful 
institutional disruption between entry or launch, legalization, and the return to business as 
usual.    
Competition between incumbent and institutionally disruptive companies as well 
as the resulting political and legal bargaining interactions have been especially intense 
during the international expansion of Transportation Network Companies (TNCs) and 
other IDCs following their success in US markets.  Major multinational TNCs were banned 
or prohibited from entering or operating in many countries, such as Japan, Denmark, 
Turkey, and Morocco.  In some cases, bans have been lifted and the new services have 
been regularized, such as in many cities in Brazil.  In other countries, such as in the case 
of Argentina, bargaining interactions between major TNCs, political leaders, and 
incumbent companies have been prolonged; political bans may have been lifted only to 
reappear through the courts.  Additionally, competition sometimes spills into extra-
institutional arenas.  There are even caza übers (über hunters!) that roam the streets of 
Buenos Aires in search of drivers to make an example of as they defend the taxi industry. 
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As such, these cases indicate that proactive and responsive strategies are vital with regard 
to planning for and navigating policy changes as well as the economic and political 
reactions of the entrenched or similarly disruptive competition.  This is especially true 
where institutional orders are stronger, more heavily defended by extant political and 
economic elites, more consequential to policy goals, noted for their significant effects in 
achieving policy goals, and have demonstrated considerable stability; as Huntington notes, 
elites are most likely to view reform favorably when results are likely to benefit them and 
to ensure a speedy return to stability (Huntington, 1968.)  That said, the dynamic nature of 
the game of institutional disruption introduces several opportunities through which IDCs 
may usurp the power to shape market governance institutions as the drama unfolds.   
Indeed, in her research on the emergence of Surveillance Capitalism, Zuboff notes that the 
key to the success of Surveillance Capitalists has been sustained operations within lawless 
space and through sustained operations in the shadows as a means of reducing contention 




DESIGNING INSTITUTIONAL DISRUPTION  
WITH ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL VISION 
 
Incumbents within most industries have the informational and infrastructural 
advantage—they know the inside game, they have connections to political leaders, and 
they have stronger brand recognition with consumers, at least at time 1. However, there is 
also a flip side to political and legal capacity. An Institutionally Disruptive Company may 
find ways to leverage a network of repeat players with high levels of legal and political 
capacity as their allies, advisors, and business partners in the design and execution of their 
product and strategy.  Thus, an IDC ought to design with legal, political, social, as well as 
economic obstacles in mind. The above contributions introduced a theoretical and 
conceptual framework—the Disruptive Opportunity Space as well as the stages of the game 
of institutional disruption.  Designing institutional disruption with foresight introduces 
several antidotes to the strategic disadvantage of the IDC.   
Knowledge Infusion Theory, Strategic Partnerships, as well as designing and 
planning with Cross-Cutting Supports in mind represent key strategic boons.  The first 
refers to incorporating insider knowledge onto your design team; you might need to attract 
defectors from the inner circle of industries that are particularly insular.  The second refers 
to creating partnerships with other organizations that might be necessary symbiotes in order 
to launch your product and company.  The more insider knowledge that you have about the 
actual rules of the game, the less likely you will be to encounter unforeseen hurdles, to find 
yourself bamboozled, and the more likely that you will be to reach the other side intact.  A 
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coalition of supporting organizations, strategic partners with a similar economic interest in 
realizing the project, is also a necessary component of many IDCs as well as of their 
products; however, coalition building must be conducted in secret in cases where the 
innovation might be usurped by a competing coalition.  Proprietary Security is an 
absolutely essential value within the conspiracy to disrupt markets and institutions; some 
have it and others create it.  Indeed, it is one of the chief theories—Proprietary Security 
Theory—that has emerged from my investigations into rule bending.  Whether you have it 
and whether you maintain it during the design and entry stages is a pivotal determinant of 
the potential outcomes.  There are many ways to create it.  Additionally, one also needs to 
know how to protect and create rights through the deployment and manipulation of Cross 
Cutting Legal and Political Support.   
There are four primary forms of cross cutting legal and political support: (1) 
Constitutional Rights v. Politics, (2) Citizen Support v. Political Elites, (3) Politics v. 
Ordinary Courts, (4) Superordinate Authorities v. subnational politicians, and (5) fighting 
fire with fire.  The latter is a last resort form of self-support that I have yet to actually 
observe in violent forms, but that has manifested itself in the illegal practice of 
“greyballing” and that might exist in legal form as goldballing or, better yet, 
platinumballing.  The latter two represent offering experiences, perks, etc. above and 
beyond the ordinary experience provided to users in reward for actions that are deemed 
favorable to a company—little positive reinforcement mechanisms of varying levels of 
intensity.       
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THE POLITICS OF MARKET ENTRY 
 
Prior to elucidating the full scope of my cross-cutting support theory, let’s briefly 
walk through the game, its incentives, as well as some of the pitfalls that one ought to have 
in mind at the time of product and strategy design.  On the political front, the goal is to 
reduce the regulatory burden, to avoid bans, as well as to build beneficial relationships with 
political actors.  On the economic front, the goal is, obviously, to maximize one’s market 
performance; however, it is important to note that sacrifices may need to be made in order 
to maximize long term performance due to political or legal constraints.    An additional 
political and economic consideration is the reaction of the competition within the political 
and legal arenas.  These may involve legal attacks, nonviolent contention, attempts to 
secure regulations that are favorable to them and inimical to the IDC, as well as violent 
reactions.   
(NON)VIOLENT REACTIONS 
 
Some might question why violence has been successfully deployed to deflect the 
entry or launch of institutionally disruptive companies or products in some contexts, but 
not within others?  The question has two components; why is violence used in some cases, 
but not others, and why is violence successful when engaged in some contexts but not 
others?  With regard to another institutional context in Brazil, The New Yorker recently 
featured an article that referred to similar phenomena, the phenomenon of permitted, state 
sanctioned, or at least unpunished, violence, as “The silence of the law” (Anderson, 2019.) 
 26 
Verily few TNCs have entered the Venezuelan market and the one that did quietly 
evacuated.  Similarly, violence was successfully engaged by incumbent companies in 
Morocco without any repercussions from legal or political elites, resulting in the flight of 
an internationally well-known TNC.  Yet the record of engaging violence has demonstrated 
spottier success within other national contexts, such as in Western Europe, Mexico, Brazil, 
and the United States.  While the operators or consumers of an institutionally disruptive 
company might be targeted so as to dissuade them from participating within the market or 
to manufacture their consumer loyalty to the violent incumbent, there is variation in the 
success of the tactic.  The cases of Brazil and the US, among others, represent instances 
where detectable violence has resulted in state sanction of incumbent companies.  
Additionally, it has similarly been less successful in Argentina, yet it remains intermittently 
visible in Buenos Aires—a guerilla opposition, of sorts.  Meanwhile, lawlessness or 
conflict have successfully forestalled the entry of major western TNCs in some contexts, 
which has led to the development of specialized local carriers.  Beyond violence, other 
forms of contention may also create costs in the long and short term for the IDC; these 
include internal and external protests that create politically induced operations costs while 
also impacting the reputation of the IDC.    
POLICY REACTIONS 
 
An IDC would prefer to expand into new jurisdictions modularly. In other words, 
the IDC would prefer to operate within a uniform environment where it could simply 
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transplant an extant model into any jurisdiction on earth without paying adaptation costs 
or increasing its fixed operating expenses relative to those within its home jurisdiction; an 
institutionally disruptive company usually seeks to minimize the Rule Density, a weighted 
measure of the inimical rules that it encounters, within a jurisdiction, especially with regard 
to those that induce adaptation and increased fixed costs.  However, the world exhibits 
extreme institutional diversity that necessitates some adaptation of companies’ models as 
they expand.  Additionally, incumbents may seek to create new institutional obstacles to a 
recent entrant, to defend institutions that favor their operations, as well as to erect 
institutional fortresses that will entrench their advantage and dissuade an IDC operating 
elsewhere from entering.  Thus, reactions within the game take place within the 
jurisdictions of operation, but they also produce shockwaves within other jurisdictions that 
the company might seek to operate within in the future. Additionally, beyond mere 
regulatory hurdles, a company might seek to have an IDC banned or a key aspect of their 
model prohibited.   An IDC in the design phase ought to design in order to reduce the 
likelihood of an intense reaction from their competitors within the political and legal 
arenas.   
LEGAL REACTIONS 
 
An IDC that presents a novel product or service and “plays the game” well may 
survive to become integrated into society; considering legal politics is essential as this 
process may be jurisgenerative, that is, the IDC may have a role in shaping and being 
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shaped by the law and institutions of a jurisdiction (Michelman, 1988.) Why might a 
competitor litigate? Simply put, it might be the most effective means of protecting a right 
or it might have alternative motivations.  Thus, the incumbents may attempt to legally 
eliminate a threatening element, or they may merely engage litigation as a scare tactic as 
they seek to incentivize sale, merger, or flight.  In some cases, they might also seek to 
create political and legal strategic costs to increase the burden of operating within a 
jurisdiction for the IDC.  Thus, in the wake of an IDC’s entry, an incumbent company may 
initiate litigation, contain its reaction within the political arena, or it may choose to allow 
entry without a reaction.   
Assuming that the anticipated expense to engage litigation or other forms of legal 
mobilization rise as the probability of a favorable decision decreases, a riskier strategy is 
also a costlier strategy.  Therefore, an IDC ought to account for its support within the legal 
arena with respect to different elements of its product and model during the design stage in 
order to reduce legal uncertainty, especially with regard to aspects that have more uncertain 
political support.   In cases where there is political support amidst legal uncertainty, there 
might be A Political Alternative.  Thus, the IDC experiencing a litigation threat must 
consider (A) the relative expected utilities of sale or merger, (B) a defense strategy in court, 




With regard to the variability of legal certainty that an IDC might encounter, there 
are cases of hummingbird beaks—those in which one must adapt to legal certainty—and 
there are others that permit greater potential for the IDC to shape the regulatory framework 
within the legal arena.  Seatbelts and contractual arrangements with regard to the TNC 
industry represent a key comparison.    On the left, two images depict the change in the 
probability distribution of a judicial decision regarding seatbelts. On the right, two images 
depict the change in the probability distribution of a judicial decision regarding contractual 
arrangements, such as the classification of drivers as contractors.  The circles represent the 
ideal points of two opposing companies.  The y axis indicates r, the probability of a decision 
being at any given point along the curve.  In the case of seatbelts, r=1 and there is no change 
between the initiation of a lawsuit and time t+1, the decision of the court.  Meanwhile, the 
distribution representing uncertainty in the case of contractual arrangements is wider and 
a decision impacts the expectations of the parties, indicating that the true position of the 
law is closer to the ideal point of company 2, though uncertainty remains.  Ability to shape 
cases of legal uncertainty is compounded when one can concurrently garner and mobilize 
r r r r 
Visuals 9, 10, 11, and 12: Contracts and Seatbelts in which Ci represents the ideal point of a company and üth represents 
the true decision of a court under conditions of full information at time t with regard to any given element h of pdth. 
Seatbelts Seatbelts 
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political support.  Additionally, one ought to ensure that their information with regard to 
the true distribution is correct.  As Holmes writes in The Path of the Law, “the most 
important and pretty nearly the whole meaning of every new effort of legal thought is to 
make [prophecies of legal prediction] more precise” (Holmes 1897, p. 458.)  Incorporating 
skilled legal counsel during the design phase is essential so as to accurately identify legal 
risks as well as to plan a coordinated political and legal strategy to shape the regulatory 
regime and to proactively design litigation response strategies.     
STATE REACTIONS 
 
The politics of institutional disruption absolutely requires a focus on the 
relationship between the IDC and its competitors, however, a number of IDCs may also 
have to consider their direct and indirect impacts on the public.  The State may enter the 
game not only as a mediator between the competing companies, but also as a representative 
of society.  The operations of an IDC may have an intrinsic public interest or an extrinsic 
public interest.   An intrinsic public interest occurs when the operations of the IDC overlap 
with or directly impact a core traditional or integral function of the State, such as the 
provision of vital services or the management of public property; examples of intrinsic 
public interest would be the recent case of Monkeyparking in San Francisco as well as the 
case of Bechtel attempting to acquire the water utility service in Cochabamba, Bolivia.  An 
extrinsic public interest occurs when the operations of the IDC inadvertently produce 
externalities that negatively impact society, such as enabling criminal enterprises, 
 31 
discriminatory practices, manchine hybrid invasions, omnipresent surveillance, or 
impinging on state policy initiatives, including the reduction of inequality; examples of 
extrinsic public interest would be the rise of Russian meddling in US elections through 
social media platforms, the use of cryptocurrency for black market transactions, or the 
spillover effects of reductions in transaction costs within labor markets.  An IDC must 
design its product with the potential for the State to enter as an obstacle to the provision of 
the product or service that the IDC intends to introduce; this may involve proactive 
mitigation strategies to reduce the perceived harms that might be caused by the entry and 
operations of an institutionally disruptive company.   
Alternatively, the State may also enter into the market as a competitor as a strategic 
response to institutional disruption.  The response of an IDC in such a situation may ensure 
that the State becomes a partner rather than an enemy NME.  Additionally, an entry strategy 
may be designed to limit the potential for the State to attempt to usurp the market in order 
to eliminate the threat of such a strategy diffusing into other major national markets.  In 
the case of TNCs, the companies have perceived opportunities to present themselves as 
partners through which the State could more efficiently achieve their public transportation 
goals, such as filling in the gaps within transit systems.  One example includes TNCs 
transporting clients to busses or ferries that lacked public transit connections.  On the flip 
side, the case of Cochabamba, Bolivia, where Bechtel sought to privatize the provision of 
water was one in which the State sided with the private entity, yet contentious civil society 
organized a campaign to successfully oppose the actions of the State and the insurgent IDC.  
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In most other cases, however, the State and civil society have usually been aligned as 
partners in these interactions between society and IDCs.   
Thus, an IDC must also responsively navigate the autonomous reaction and 
responses of the State to its operations in order to achieve and sustain legal status while 
also continuing to maximize its market performance; this illustrates that the State has tools 
beyond mere regulation in order to integrate and attempt to tame an IDC in order to 
incorporate them as partners in achieving broader policy goals or in order to reduce their 
direct or indirect negative impacts on society.   The State will be most likely to enter as a 
key active strategic player, that is as a competitor within the market, when the operations 
of an IDC have an intrinsic public interest.  Though the State and the Law will absolutely 
enter as autonomous strategic actors, that is as regulators, in the case of an IDC with 
extrinsic public interest as well; an example is the ongoing litigation against Facebook for 
alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act due to the use of its platform to run 
discriminatory advertising campaigns (Isaac, 2019.)  Accounting for externalities, 
proactively resolving them, as well as cushioning those that are of a transitory nature may 
ensure that relations between the IDC and the State are less conflictual.  A strategic 
response to the entry of the State as an autonomous actor, either as a regulator or as a 
credible potential competitor, requires political, legal, and adaptive strategies in order to 
preserve market share and market performance.  
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RESPONDING TO BANS AND PROHIBITIONS 
 
There are multiple strategic responses that may be engaged in response to a ban or 
prohibition within a jurisdiction of operation.  Chief among these is the strategy of 
Noncompliant Advocacy, which involves continuing to provide a good or service in 
contravention of a ban or prohibition while simultaneously seeking a legal right to provide 
it.  An IDC must balance political and economic risks as well as strategic costs as it seeks 
to achieve a legal right in cases where its product is illegal or of uncertain legality.  The 
alternative strategies involve various forms of compliant advocacy, such as adapting the 
product to comply or enacting a strategic exit.   
A period of noncompliant advocacy may be accompanied with what I refer to as 
Restrained Adaptation.  Restrained Adaptation is a strategy through which the IDC 
identifies and preserves the integral components of its product, those that represent the crux 
of its comparative advantage and drive consumer support.1  In cases of Noncompliant 
Advocacy, this involves some adaptation of the product, but not necessarily full 
compliance. As the IDC is seeking to gain or to regain a legal right, some adaptation of the 
most strongly opposed elements may be a key means of regaining the support of political 
elites as well as consumers that the company might mobilize as it seeks to shape the 
perceptions of politicians deciding its case.  Collier, Carter, and Dubal have studied the 
 
1 In general, Restrained Adaptation allows a company to manage and balance its internal, elite, and consumer 
relations during periods of institutional disruption while ensuring that it does not succumb to political and 
legal pressure. Additionally, this strategy may be a component of a multistage campaign to increase market 
performance. 
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increased ability of TNCs and other disruptive companies to mobilize their consumers 
(Collier, et al 2018;) additionally, Thelen and Culpepper have elucidated what they refer 
to as Platform Power: the ability of many new IDCs to mobilize and directly engage with 
their subscribers (Thelen and Culpepper 2019.)  These support building and mobilizing 
capacities are key means through which one may seek to overcome regulatory obstacles.    
In addition to mobilizing within jurisdiction supporters, an IDC may also contact 
higher level, superordinate authorities. An example of this dynamic was the TNC 
industry’s response to heightened regulation within the City of Austin, Texas.  When 
Austin increased its background check requirements, the TNCs engaged strategic exits 
from the city.  They later reentered once their negotiations with state level politicians 
successfully erased the local regulations that they opposed.  In some cases, an IDC might 
engage such an option with a similarly successful result; however, even where the 
superordinate politician supports the IDC, a strategic exit from the market may create a 
vacuum in which the competition may develop viable means of usurping the market share 
previously enjoyed by the IDC.  The appendix includes a more detailed examination of the 
conditions under which an IDC ought to choose to engage the strategy of Noncompliant 
Advocacy (page 42.)  
A RETURN TO THE DESIGN STAGE 
 
A return to the design stage is now in order.  In the depth of the planning stages, an 
IDC must discover and create the clear light that will guide them as they seek to disrupt 
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markets, capturing hearts and minds.  Thus, the game of institutional disruption is a difficult 
game, not an impossible game; it all begins with a choice by a potential IDC on whether 
or not to enter a jurisdiction.  Additionally, as the company chooses to enter, it must also 
design its ideal product, its strategically adapted product, as well as its entry and long-term 
growth strategy.  The primary goal of the IDC is to consolidate and increase its consumer 
base in order to maximize its market performance. However, it must also simultaneously 
seek to reduce the political and legal strategy expenses necessary to achieve legalization 
and favorable regulation while minimizing the politically induced operations costs 
incurred due to the political reactions of competitors or political actors within the 
jurisdiction; as we have discussed, these politically induced operations costs may include 
sanctions from politicians or they may result from the contentious actions of citizens, 
workers, as well as competing companies.  Additionally, an IDC will especially seek to 
ensure that their operations are not banned or that elements of their product are not 
prohibited.   
Planning and designing with cross-cutting political and legal support in mind 
involve considering the above pitfalls—how to identify and avoid or navigate them—and 
incentives—how to maximize market performance and minimize costs.  This may involve 
some product adaptation as well as the design of cunning strategies to emerge victorious.  
Constitutional rights may protect the company against elite political opposition; 
pornography cases, as well as certain works of satire have received such protections, among 
others.  Citizen support may provide political and economic support against elite 
opposition, which enables periods of noncompliant advocacy, such as in the case of TNCs 
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in Argentina, or strategic exits to engage option 4, such as in Austin, Texas, or the threat 
thereof, such as in Quebec. Political support may protect the company against the inimical 
decisions of ordinary courts where constitutional rights are not involved, such as with 
regard to disputes about the employment status of independent contractors; while a court 
may rule that the workers were misclassified, the local politicians may intervene to provide 
statutory clarification to enable the contracting practices of the institutionally disruptive 
company.  Similarly, if a court were to rule that an IDC needed to adapt its service to 
completely resemble the archaic operating framework of the extant incumbents, such as 
requiring TNC drivers to possess taxi medallions, a politician could step in to introduce an 
alternative regulatory framework that would enable modern technologically empowered 
models to operate within the jurisdiction.  Superordinate authorities may also be consulted 
to protect the company from subordinate authorities within jurisdictions that present more 
obstacles to the company, such as in Austin, Texas, where Über and Lyft both enacted 
strategic exits and appealed to state legislators to overrule local regulations in response to 
inimical background check laws. Major TNCs similarly pursued national level strategy of 
regulatory homogenization in Brazil; as the company spread throughout more than 41 cities 
within the country, it encountered a variety of institutional constraints that it sought to 
overcome in order to reduce adaptation costs as well as to quell unrest that was resulting 
in politically induced operations costs.  The major TNCs achieved a victory in Brazil in 
2018 in their efforts to achieve favorable regulations throughout the country (Adghirni and 
Preissler Iglesias 2018.) 
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Once one has analyzed the strategic playing field to determine the likely obstacles, 
the product and strategy may be designed with foresight—with economic, political, and 
legal vision.  In some cases, this may require restrained adaptation of the product as the 
company seeks to shape the law and policies within the jurisdiction to permit and favor its 
operations; some of these adaptations, however, may be temporary.  This introduces what 
I refer to as Camouflaged strategies.  A company may enter with a product that is less 
threatening, and there are many reasons to do so, while simultaneously having a plan to 
release its full product and achieve market dominance.  A chief reason is to limit reactive 
responses to entry.  The IDC ought to want the incumbents to pay it no mind or to temporize 
with it, depending upon its relative bargaining power.  However, once it has developed 
sufficient political support in order to overcome some of the obstacles that the incumbents 
might throw in its way—attempts to ban the IDC, to prohibit key aspects of the operations 
of the IDC, as well as attempts to emulate the methods of the IDC before it captures their 
entire market share—the full product may be released.  This can advance economic, 
political, and legal goals simultaneously, such as fostering trust among consumers as well 
as amongst competitors through demonstrating restraint with regard to playing by the rules 
of the game.  This incremental release strategy accompanied with a relatively less 
disruptive entry may also allow for reduced scrutiny of its operations, directing the 
omnipresent eye towards other prey and creating opportunities for another burst of market 
and institutional disruption.   
Additionally, the dynamic pressure to conform ought to inform the strategic 
planning and decisions of an IDC.  The period of institutional disruption, or at least its 
 38 
peak, may be brief and intense; however, in order to survive, an IDC may have to make 
compromises that will pull it towards the center as economic, legal, and political actors 
seek to correct for perceived externalities, enhance their own position within any given 
arena, and restore balance in the wake of institutional disruption.  The IDC must also expect 
to be bound by new rules due to these compromises; some may represent permanent new 
rules of the game carried over from the prior market governance system; yet, as mentioned 
above, others may be temporary.  This reflects what I refer to as the “illusion” of disruption.   
An IDC may successfully enter and enact transformations within a market and an 
industry, but it must not succumb to the illusion that such rapid changes are sustainable; 
there are pressures that will draw it back towards the center, forces that lead to a long term 
regression towards the prior state as more and more strategic partners latch on, crises rear 
their heads, and compromises are made.  People are often fans of the innovations that 
institutionally disruptive strategies present, but not of their externalities; additionally, a 
company that continues to push up against society, that continues to disrupt, is likely to 
incentivize a less disruptive emulator to capture the hearts and minds of the electorate, if 
not the consumers themselves as well.  Thus, the IDC must have a plan to integrate itself 
into society, intelligently identify and navigate Disruptive Opportunities Spaces, and return 
to business as usual, lest the IDC or its leadership experience an internal coup or an external 
competitive threat.  The case of Über provides a case in point about the challenges that 
leaders of institutionally disruptive companies have encountered as their companies take 
on greater prominence; meanwhile, the examples of Napster and Apple iTunes represent 
an extreme ideal typical example of the latter.   
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Planning and designing with foresight with the above challenges in mind as well as 
responding to unforeseen obstacles as they rear their heads ought to increase the likelihood 
of a company successfully introducing an institutionally disruptive product, technology, or 
service into a jurisdiction.  Additionally, accounting for reintegration, ensuring that one 
does not succumb to the “illusion” of disruption, ought to increase the likelihood of a 
company and its leadership maintaining relative control and solidifying their position 
within the market.  Additional research could determine whether these cunning and savvy 
strategies actually increase success or whether successful institutional disruption is an 
entirely random process.  Does involving experts in the design process, per the expectations 
of the Knowledge Infusion Theory—we could call what they provide Disruption Kits—
actually increase the probability and intensity of success?  Are proprietary considerations 
key drivers of the behavior of successful institutionally disruptive companies?  Are 
companies that account for the full spectrum of their cross-cutting supports as well as their 
cross-cutting challenges—peering into the legal, economic, social, cultural, and political 






This masters’ report has introduced a conceptual and theoretical framework to 
guide future researchers and practitioners.  There are numerous questions that could be 
investigated further as well as strategies that could be deployed IRL.  One such strategy 
includes manufacturing an evil disruptor, similar to Napster within an industry, while 
waiting to release something more akin to Apple iTunes as the savior of the industry, its 
incumbent leaders, consumers, as well as those employed within it.  The strategic shaping 
of perceptions could be a key means of introducing unexpected underdog innovations.  Yet 
it could also be a means of bending the law towards the dark side. 
The nature of the law and our legal institutions is between flux and stasis; ideally, 
the law is a system that produces flow while preserving key tenets of our societies.  Some 
elements ought to remain in stasis, especially those that are agreed upon higher moral 
values, such as the dignity and intrinsic value of human life.  As the pace of technological-
social-political-economic change increases, opportunities for disruption will become more 
common.  As these interactions have revealed so far, they may be productive when they 
are subject to political debate and legal processes.  In this report, the true nature of the law, 
what many believe is a stable system of rules, is presented as a system that regulates the 
possible, as a system within which much may still be created as uncertainty comes and 
goes.  Much may be created within the bounded chaos of these spaces of legal uncertainty 
as they emerge; this chaos becomes what one creates within it and against the inherent 
constraints of diverse legal systems within their political contexts. 
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Those who oppose the type of approach to law that I and others present, those who 
believe that my presentation of the law as something malleable, something subject to the 
creative force of the human will might argue that such a presentation of the law could be 
harmful.  Fuller (1958), in his response to Hart (1958), makes such a claim while criticizing 
positivistic theorists of the law.  Yet, in truth, explicating the truth of the law need not be 
harmful; as long as the stewards of the law recognize attempts to create that are genuinely 
tempered by a will to create greater shared prosperity, and differentiate them from those 
guided by nothing more than lust for power and profit, the positive law may still be guided 
by a moral hand.   As long as a quality process, informed by the substantive aspirations of 
the people continues to exist and judges, lawyers, as well as the other defenders of a just, 
tolerant, open society remain as its stewards, malicious attempts to pervert the law may be 
detected and corrected.  Yet, as Fuller and Hart both discuss in their essays, the positive 
law may go to dark places.  
I remain optimistic that we will detect and successfully combat any such attempts 
to repeat the darker sagas of our past.  The interactions between Institutionally Disruptive 
Companies and legal systems in their political contexts thus far support my optimistic view 
of our future. Again, the example of applications that auctioned public parking spaces 
demonstrate that innovation may take multiple directions and that the law, in tandem with 
politics, has a vital role in guiding it; whereas the early versions had a parasitic effect and 
were banned within a major city, the same technology has been employed by multiple other 
companies to connect users to private providers of parking within major cities.  The 
efficiency goals of such companies may also be realized through public-private 
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partnerships or other alternatives that would ensure that increasing the efficiency does not 
result in an increase in inequality.  Law, politics, and the creative will of tech entrepreneurs 
may conflict, but their interactions are productive in the aggregate when such conflict takes 
place within relatively transparent public view.  As such, key tenets, such as intellectual 
property, privacy and human rights, and freedom of expression, among others, may be 




Responding to Bans and Prohibitions (Continued.) 
The Strategy of Noncompliant Advocacy 
 
 
Competition induces pressure to engage Noncompliant Advocacy when an 
Institutionally Disruptive Company expects that a competitor, either an incumbent or a 
similarly disruptive emulator, will be able to legalize the banned or prohibited good or 
service within the jurisdiction if the IDC complies.  Thus, regulators ought to consider 
these incentives in designing regulatory schemes as well.   
A number of strategic challenges await an aspiring institutionally disruptive 
company as it walks the tightrope to successful institutional disruption; between disruption 
and business as usual, one of the most common obstacles is a ban on the IDC or a 
prohibition against an integral component of pdt*. A key strategy engaged by institutionally 
disruptive companies within the game of institutional disruption is a noncompliant 
response to a ban or prohibition alongside political and legal advocacy to achieve a legal 
right to operate or to legalize the prohibited aspect of the product or service provided by 
the IDC.  This component of the game focuses on the interaction between the decision-
making process of the IDC, but also takes the anticipated reactions of politicians, 
competitors, consumers, producers, and citizens, as well as legal actors into account.  
Noncompliant Advocacy is not intended to be an equilibrium, but a transitory state as an 
institutionally disruptive company pursues a legal right while the disruptive opportunity 
space remains open.  The focus of this component of the game is the decision to engage 
noncompliance alongside advocacy in order to achieve a legal right to operate or to provide 
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pdt* when doing so is costly in the short run.  Clearly many companies will sustain illegal 
operations if their market performance outweighs the politically induced cost of operating, 
regardless of legality.  Additionally, extreme adaptation to the prevailing or newly installed 
market governance institutions is not a strategy that a nascent or even an established IDC 
would adopt, lest it lose its competitive advantage; the case of TNCs in Japan represents 
an exception to this rule, however, it is a unique case.  The question is, therefore, why do 
some institutionally disruptive companies respond with noncompliant advocacy when 
doing so induces Relative Political Risk as compared to the strategy of Compliant 
Advocacy?  This increased political risk may involve a higher probability of not achieving 
full legalization or it may involve incurring politically induced operations costs as a result 
of the reactions of compliant incumbent companies or due to the enforcement efforts of 
politicians within the jurisdiction. 
 
The key to determining the conditions under which a company chooses Noncompliant 
Advocacy, rather than Compliant Advocacy in response to an inimical political or legal 
obstacle is to consider the Economic Risk that a compliant strategy might introduce.  The 
model that I have developed for this component of the game integrates the long term and 
short term political and economic considerations that an idc must account for at time t-1 
prior to deciding to engage noncompliant advocacy during period t in order to attempt to 
achieve legalization of pdt*at time t+1.   The parameters of the model include r, the 
probability of legalization given the strategy selected, the market performance of the IDC, 
the politically induced operations costs incurred due to noncompliance, the costs to engage 
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a coordinated political and/or legal strategy to achieve legalization of pdt* during period t,  
as well as the probability, b, that a competitor, either another IDC or an adaptive incumbent, 
swoops in to capture part of the market while Company1, the IDC considering 
noncompliance, suspends its operations during a period of compliant advocacy.  The model 
also includes a discount factor, , which represents the relative weight that the decision 
maker places upon future utility.  The inclusion of Economic Risk, in the form of a 
competitive threat that would reduce future market performance, allows the model to 
produce observable implications regarding the conditions under which an IDC will be more 
likely to engage noncompliant advocacy. 
 
Visual 13: Market Performance and Legalization 
N represents the Net Market Performance during a ban or prohibition and Z represents the Net Market Performance after successful legalization.  
A* indicates the value of a parameter for a noncompliant strategy and a ‘ indicates the value of a parameter for a compliant strategy, while this 
visual assumes that N*>N’, the opposite could be true, yet, the model would still produce a discontinuity in which Z*>Z’. 
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Visual 7 provides a succinct depiction of this logic.  While the relative net market 
performance of the IDC engaging noncompliant advocacy during period t may be lower or 
higher than the net market performance of the IDC during compliant advocacy, the 
Economic Risk introduced by a competitive threat as well as the potential for legalization 
and a discontinuous increase in market performance provides an incentive, under certain 
conditions, for an IDC to engage Noncompliant Advocacy, rather than a compliant 
strategy. 
The Relative Political Risk of a compliant strategy is represented as 𝑃 =
(𝑟′ − 𝑟∗)𝑚𝑖𝑡+1
∗
, where r* indicates the probability of legalization given a noncompliant 
strategy, r’ indicates the probability of legalization given a compliant strategy, and mit+1* 
represents the market performance of company i at time t+1 given that no competitor 
successfully enters to capture part of the market within the jurisdiction.  The Relative 
Economic Risk of compliance is represented as 𝐸 = 𝑏𝑟′(𝑚𝑖𝑡+1
∗−𝑚𝑖𝑡+1
′), where mit+1’ 
represents the market performance of company i and time t+1 if a competitor enters to 
capture part of the market while the idc is complying.  Thus, the IDC contemplating 
noncompliant advocacy must first balance the reduction in political risk against the 







An institutionally disruptive company must also consider the short-term Relative 
Strategic Costs to pursue a strategy, S, which includes oit, mit, and zit.  As such, the short-
term Relative Strategic Costs to pursue noncompliant advocacy, S*, or compliant 
advocacy, S’, must be balanced against the long-term gains.2 Together, P, S, and E define 
the space within which a company may choose to enact a strategy of noncompliant 
advocacy during period t in pursuit of legalization, represented as the gray area within 
figure 8.  The parameter space within which a company may decide to engage 
noncompliant advocacy may expand or contract as the component elements of S change 
over time, such as if there is a decrease or an increase in consumption, strategic costs, or 
 
2 An extension of the model also accounts for the choice between sustained illegality versus a brief period of 
noncompliant advocacy in pursuit of legalization.  A threshold s** demarcates the point at which a company 
might enter the black market rather than comply or sustain noncompliant advocacy (See Appendix AA.)  The 
effect of illegality on market performance and politically induced operations costs determine the choice; 
however, the companies that are considered in my research prefer to seek the light, that is to gain a legal right 
to operate.  
Visual 14: Strategic Curves and Political Economic Risk, The Noncompliant Parameter Space  
P=Political Risk, S=Strategic Costs, and E=Economic Risk 
Strategic Curves and Political-Economic Risk 
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enforcement at time t+1 relative to time t-1. The white area represents the parameter space 
within which an institutionally disruptive company will decide to engage compliant 
advocacy.  Meanwhile, the black site represents the parameter space in which a company 
would choose compliant exit.  When S* is greater than S’, a company will comply.  As 




An Institutionally Disruptive Company must juggle Political risk, Strategic costs, 
and economic Risk as it walks a tightrope in order to achieve a legal right to operate within 
any given jurisdiction.  A brief period of noncompliant advocacy may, under certain 
conditions, be strategically advantageous as an IDC traverses this tightrope.   A key 
implication of the model is that companies whose intellectual property rights are less secure 
or whose technological innovation is more easily replicated will anticipate higher 
Economic Risk and will be more likely to pursue noncompliant advocacy as a strategy in 
the wake of an inimical legal or political decision that inhibits their provision of pdt*.   
THE PROOF(S) 
 
The company calculus considers both long run and short run risks and costs.  The 
first step is to compare the long run risks associated with the alternative strategies.  Once 
the long-term implications of alternative strategies have been compared, the company must 
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also consider the short run costs and risks associated with the divergent strategies.  The 
long run risks are primarily the differential political and economic risks that each strategy 
entails.  The company must seek to balance the different forms of long-term risk that each 
of the available strategies would induce.  Additionally, during the second step, a company 
must then consider the differential short run costs associated with pursuing one of these 
strategies in light of their divergent continuation values.   
 







The expected market performance if no competitors enter is assumed to be larger 
than if a competitor enters to capture some of the market share that the company served 
or expected to serve prior to the prohibition on its services.  A company may earn this 
level of market performance upon legalization through either a noncompliant or a 
compliant strategy, however, compliance introduces a probability b that a competitor, 
such as another idc or an adaptive incumbent competitor, swoops in to capture the 
market.  
EU: (Noncompliance) = 3 
 
3 The expected utilities include the net market performance during period t, N=mit-zit-oit, as well as the utility 
from legalization at time t+1. The alternate possibility, (1-r) is not included within the respective utility 
functions above as time t+1 represents a new choice point at which the company may choose an alternative 
strategy or continue the strategy that it employed during period t; essentially, this aspect of the continuation 
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𝑚𝑖𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖𝑡






EU: (Compliance) =  
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THE INDIFFERENCE POINT (CONSIDERING SHORT RUN COSTS) 
 
Simplifying the expected continuation values as C* and C’, respectively, represents the 
relationships between the costs of a compliant versus and noncompliant strategy that would have 
to hold in order for an institutionally disruptive company to decide to operate illegally in the wake 
of a prohibition.   
Thus, C* represents the expected boon from a period of illegal operations while C’ 
represents the result of compliance. 
 
value is equal for both strategies and both include (1-r), where  represents the choice the company makes 
at time t+1, which is unknown at time t-1. Time t+1 represents the checkpoint at which the company projects 
it will achieve legalization. 
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′ = 𝑚𝑖𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖𝑡




∗ + 𝑜𝑖𝑡 −𝑚𝑖𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖𝑡
′  
 
The right-hand side of the above equation represents the costs of noncompliance relative 
to a compliant strategy. The elements within the parenthesis represent the costs to pursue strategy 
r* in which politically induced operations costs as well as political expenses may be offset by 
ongoing market performance; however, this highlights an additional form of short run Economic 
Risk in which illegal operations may have an effect on consumer behavior during the period of 
illegality.  Thus, the expected politically induced operations costs, the relative cost of strategy r* 
as compared to r’, as well as the expected market performance during the period of illegality inform 
the decision with regard to compliance.   
 
EU (Compliance) < EU (Noncompliance) iff 𝐶∗−𝐶′ ≥ (𝑧𝑖𝑡





The proof requires three steps, though the company calculus involves two.   
 
Step 1: Comparing the relative long run continuation values 
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Looking deeper into the continuation values, the company must first consider the different 
factors that will determine the relative continuation values even prior to considering the costs to 
engage strategies r’ or r*. 
 














Because the discount factors are equal, and because the current proof does not yet consider 
the short run costs, locating the point at which a company would be indifferent can be done through 




























′) = (𝑟′ − 𝑟∗)(𝑚𝑖𝑡+1
∗) 
 
The left side of the equation represents an increase in Relative Economic Risk, or the 
increase in risk induced through a compliant strategy due to the possibility that a competitor will 
take advantage of the opportunity to snatch up consumers and reduce the company’s future market 
share at the time of legalization.  The effect of competitors on 𝑚𝑖𝑡+1 could be small even if b is 
large if a company expects that they will be able to quickly reassert dominance within a market 
upon a return to providing services once legalization has been achieved.   
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The right side of the equation represents a reduction in Relative Political Risk, or the risk 
reduced through a compliant strategy.  Essentially, if r’ is greater than r*, there is a benefit to 
compliance as the company may be able to more quickly and efficiently achieve legalization 
through a compliant legal and political strategy.  However, the right side must be balanced against 
the left side so as to ensure that compliance would not induce another form of risk. As such, an idc 
must consider tradeoffs between Political Risk and Economic Risk when making decisions 
regarding compliance with regard to prohibitions on their provision of goods or services.   
Thus, when reincorporating the discount factor to allow these long run considerations to 
be balanced against the short run economic and political costs, the relative utility of a compliant 
strategy as compared to a noncompliant strategy, the inverse of C*-C’ as considered above, 
becomes: 
 









The True Indifference Point (Integrating Long Run and Short Run Considerations) 
 
As (𝑟′ − 𝑟∗)𝑚𝑖𝑡+1
∗
 represents the Relative Political Risk of compliance and 𝑏𝑟′(𝑚𝑖𝑡+1
∗−𝑚𝑖𝑡+1
′) 
represents the Relative Economic Risk of compliance, the two may be substituted for purposes of 
simplification as P and E, respectively, in order to represent the relative utility of a compliant 
strategy.    
As such, if the difference between the utility of compliance and noncompliance is positive, 
the company must then consider the short run factors involved in step 2 (Above).   The long run 
reduction in political risk as a result of compliance must be large enough in relation to the economic 
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risks induced by compliance such that the relative short run costs of Compliant Advocacy, a strategy 
in which the company continues political and legal advocacy while temporarily suspending 
economic operations, would make compliance more attractive than noncompliance.  Where the 
short run political and legal costs of Compliant Advocacy, zit’, are greater than C’, an alternative 
compliance strategy may be pursued in which the company ceases political, legal and economic 
operations entirely within any jurisdiction j  
(AKA a Temporary or permanent, Compliant Exit.)    
A situation in which the relative utility of compliance is less than the expected utility of 
noncompliance requires that the company determine that the relative cost to engage a noncompliant 
strategy r* be outweighed by the relative expected utility of noncompliance and ongoing illegal 
operations.  Thus, the company must also consider the relative strategic costs of alternative 
strategies. 
As the costs to engage strategies r* or r’, zit* and zit’ respectively, the market performance 
during period t, mit, and the politically induced operations costs, oit, represent the total strategic 
costs involved in the short-term calculus, they may be represented as S, the Relative Strategic Cost. 
The Relative Strategic Cost of compliance or noncompliance are represented as S’ and S*, 
respectively.   
 
𝑆∗ = 𝑧𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝑜𝑖𝑡 −𝑚𝑖𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 
 
𝑆′ = 𝑚𝑖𝑡 − (𝑧𝑖𝑡




The two equations are mirror images and account for the consideration of the opportunity 
costs as well as the strategic costs of pursuing alternative strategies; note that the equation is 
considered during step 2 (Above), thereby bringing the proof full circle to integrate the long run 
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and short run considerations.  Within the equation for S’, 𝑚𝑖𝑡 − (𝑧𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝑜𝑖𝑡) represents the potential 
opportunity cost of pursuing a compliant strategy; this includes the potential for the company to 
offset strategic costs through market performance during a period of noncompliant advocacy.  
Meanwhile, the equation for the relative strategic cost of noncompliance includes the cost of the 
alternative compliant strategy, 𝑧𝑖𝑡
′, in order to account for the difference between the cost of 






 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑖𝑓𝑓                                𝛿 (
𝑃 − 𝐸
1 − 𝛿
) ≥ 𝑆′                                                                                                              
 
𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑖𝑓𝑓                        𝑆′ ≥ 𝛿 (
𝑃 − 𝐸
1− 𝛿
) >  𝑆∗                                                                                                   
                                                                               𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                                                                                                       
 
 
Noncompliant Advocacy v. Illegal Operations 
A wrinkle remains unresolved unless we also consider that there is a threshold, 𝑆∗ ≤ 𝑠∗∗ < 0, at 
which some companies might prefer to covertly continue operations without pursuing a legal right.  
Two intermediate considerations must also be accounted for in order to locate the threshold and 
elucidate when and where we ought to expect to observe the alternative forms of noncompliance.  
One path of noncompliance ideally leads to the light of the law; the other descends deeper into the 
shadows.  The path that a company chooses depends upon their beliefs about the stability of oit as 
well as the sustainability of mit during a period, or during multiple periods, of noncompliance.  If 
mit is greater than oit, but less than zit+oit, a company may prefer to continue illegal operations 
without pursuing a legal right to operate.  However, if the company expects that oit may become 
costlier in the future due to variable enforcement or if the company expects that sustained illegal 
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operations may have a negative effect on mit 
over time, the company may choose to 
pursue noncompliant advocacy rather than 
sheer lawlessness.  This decision depends 
upon the utility of Risk Reduction that the 
potential of legal discontinuity would 
represent for the institutionally disruptive 
company, r*oit+1, as well as the short term 
economic risk of reduced consumption, 
which is represented as (mit+n*-mit+n’)c, 
where c represents the probability of a 
reduction in consumption during interval n 
or period t. 
An intermediate consideration regarding potential fluctuations in mit during interval n of 
period t elucidates why some companies choose compliant or noncompliant advocacy rather than 
entering the shadows.  Time t+1 may be thought of as a summation of intervals n during which the 
company engaging Noncompliant or Compliant Advocacy earns a net market performance N* or 
N’, respectively. Alternatively, the anticipated N** may be higher at first, however, as the time 
nears t+1, N** may become N’’.  Thus, N*, or in some cases N’ may be higher as the company 
either maintains consumer loyalty or reduces politically induced operations costs during the ban, 
or completely eliminates them due to legalization. 
 
   
 
Regarding Illegal Operations 
Visual 15: Regarding Illegal Operations 
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Visual 16: A Temporal Comparison of the relative utilities of Compliant Advocacy, Noncompliant Advocacy, and Illegal 
Operations 
NA v. IO 
 
* indicates the value of a parameter while pursuing a legal right in cases where the parameter exists 
for both strategy types. 
‘ indicates the value of a parameter for operating illegally in cases where the parameter exists for 
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The long run utility of a potential elimination of politically induced operations costs as well 
as the potentially higher level of market performance due to pursuing legality must be greater than 
the short-term cost to pursue legality.  Thus, the threshold s** exists where zit* is equal to the long 
run utility of the relative consumption increase, the reduction in Short term Economic Risk, as well 
as the relative Risk Reduction that may be gained through achieving legalization.   
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